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Spending, canvassing and electoral success in marginal 




Substantial evidence shows デｴ;デ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲげ ;ﾐS ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐIｷWゲ ;デ UK ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ 
elections are influenced by the intensity of their local campaigns, but that evidence is almost invariably based 
on analyses of voting across all constituencies. Most constituencies are unlikely to change hands, however. 
This paper explores whether the impact of spending varies according to seat marginality and analyses the 
pattern of spending and canvassing in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginals in England and all 59 
constituencies in Scotland. The results are consistent with expectations: campaigning and canvassing matters 






Considerable research shows デｴ;デ W;Iｴ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ;Iヴﾗゲゲ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐIｷWゲ ;デ 
British general elections is a function of the intensity of its campaigning there. Various indicators all 
show that the greater the intensity of candidatesげ local campaigns the better their performance 
(Johnston 1987; Denver and Hands 1997; Fisher et al. 2014; Johnston and Pattie 2014; Pattie et al. 
2017). 
 
Most of that research has analysed all constituencies, which is of marginal relevance to appreciating 
I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐｷﾐｪげゲ importance to the overall election result. The outcome in most British constituencies 
is almost certain; they are けsafeげ for one of the parties and very unlikely に save a major shift in 
opinion に to change hands. The focus is thus on the marginal seats, which now comprise about one-
seventh of the total (Curtice 2018a). The more votes a party garners in a marginal seat, the greater 
its probability of victory there, contributing to the overall outcome. Elsewhere, winning more votes 
ﾏ;┞ WﾏHWﾉﾉｷゲｴ デｴW I;ﾐSｷS;デWげゲ ヴWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐ H┌デ ｴ;┗W ﾐﾗ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏW に either locally or 
nationally.  
 
This paper focuses on those competitive seats at the 2017 general election, valuable for this purpose 
for two reasons. First, in England the relative performance of the two main parties in the marginal 
constituencies varied considerably; there was no uniform swing and each gained seats from the 
other. Secondly, Scotland, with a very different pattern of party competition from England, saw a 
strong, but spatially variable, shift of support across the country away from the SNP, which won 56 
of the 59 seats in 2015 but lost 21 of them two years later.   
 
Two indicators of local campaign intensity are deployed: the amount each candidate spent; and the 
volume ﾗa Iﾗﾐデ;Iデ HWデ┘WWﾐ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲげ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ┗ﾗデWヴゲく TｴW ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ S;デ; IﾗﾏW 
from I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲげ returns to the Electoral Commission;1 as the maximum that can be spent varies 
according to constituency type (urban or rural) and electorate, the amount is expressed as a 
percentage of that maximum. Most expenditure is on printing posters and, especially, leaflets and 
similar material. 
 
                                                          
1 The data on constituency campaign spending at recent UK General Elections are compiled and published by 




Cﾗﾐデ;Iデ S;デ; IﾗﾏW aヴﾗﾏ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲ デﾗ デｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ EﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ “デ┌S┞げゲ (BES) 2014-2017 internet panel 
survey.2 In the immediate post-election survey (Wave 13) they were asked if they had been 
contacted by each of the parties during the previous four weeks and whether that contact was by: 
letter/leaflet, phone, at home, in the street, via social media, and by email, allowing calculation of 
the percentage of each Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞げゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲ Iﾗﾐデ;IデWS H┞ W;Iｴ ヮ;ヴデ┞ by each mode.3 
Although not a random sample of the local electorate, these percentages provide a general indicator 
of how active each party was canvassing support there. The analyses focus on contact that is 
personalised and intentional, excluding that via leaflet and letter.4 Social media and email contacts 
mainly use デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ S;デ;H;ゲWゲ ﾗa ┗ﾗデWヴゲげ Iﾗﾐデ;Iデ SWデ;ｷﾉゲ ;ﾐS ;ヴW ;ｷﾏWS ;デ ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ HWﾉｷW┗Wd 
probable supporters; home visits are largely concentrated on areas where known supporters live. 
The intent is to mobilise likely supporters and achieve maximum turnout rather than to convert, 
especially in the marginal seats (although Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018, suggest that the 
CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗Wゲげ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐゲ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ ┘Wﾉﾉ デ;ヴｪWデWS ｷﾐ ヲヰヱΑ; they also discuss に pp. 308ff. に デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ 
social media campaigns, whose reach cannot readily be accessed through the available data). 
 
Are campaigns in the marginals different? 
 
The first analyses examine whether campaign effects differ between marginal and less competitive 
seats. Parties devote greater resources to the former than the latter (Pattie and Johnston 2003; 
Johnston and Pattie 2014; Pattie et al. 2017), but does the marginal reward for additional campaign 
effort differ between more and less competitive seats? If it does, there is good reason to examine 
campaign effects in the marginals separately.  
 
We look at the effects of the Conservative and Labour constituency campaigns across all seats, and 
then separately for: seats won by either the Conservatives or Labour at the 2015 election; seats 
gained by the Conservatives in 2015; and seats gained by Labour then. Investigating Conservative- 
and Labour-held seats separately allows assessment of incumbency effects に ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ﾉﾗI;ﾉ 
campaigns tend to yield larger results where they are the challenger locally than where they are 
defending a seat (Pattie et al. 2017).  
 
The dependent variable is the percentage point difference between Labour and Conservative 2017 
vote shares: positive values indicate seats where Labour outpolled the Conservatives; negative 
values the reverse.  The independent variables are: the percentage point difference between Labour 
and Conservative 2015 vote shares (measuring the ゲW;デげゲ marginality); 2017 constituency campaign 
spending by Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats; and the interactions between the 2015 
Labour-Conservative vote difference and each campaign spending variable. These interactions allow 
exploring whether the marginal effects of campaign effort vary depending on seat marginality. As 
the Conservatives were generally believed to have benefited most from the Iﾗﾉﾉ;ヮゲW ｷﾐ UKIPげゲ 
                                                          
2 This very large survey に an unweighted total of 31,197 respondents に covers all British constituencies with an 
average of just under 50 in each. 
3 For details of the questions, go to https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/. 
4 Some of the contact by phone may be through random dialling of numbers and contact in the street may 
involve a serendipitous meeting between a canvasser and a voter. We exclude the percentage contacted by 
letter or leaflet for two reasons. First, unfortunately this confounds two separate forms of canvassing. Many 
candidates circulate leaflets to a substantial proportion of the local electorate using the provision that allows 
them to send one item through the postal system for free; these provide information but little more. Letters to 
┗ﾗデWヴゲ ;ヴW ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS ふ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ I;ゲWゲ ゲWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｴW;Sケ┌;ヴデWヴゲ 
rather than from the local candidate) and are part of the careful targeting of potential supporters in marginal 
seats, but the nature of the data makes it impossible to separate out this type of canvassing from the 
distribution of leaflets. Secondly, since most of the money spent on local campaigns goes on the printing of 




support between the two elections (from 12.6 to 1.8 per cent), UKIPげs 2015 vote share was included, 
plus a dummy variable for whether it fielded a candidate in 2017 (it fielded 624 in the 632 
constituencies in 2015 but only 378 two years later; the constituency held by the Speaker is excluded 
from these analyses). 
 
The regression results are in Table 1; the significant spending coefficients show, for example, that 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ｴ;S ; ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヲヰヱΑ ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏW に the more Labour spent the better 
its performance relative to the Conservatives (because ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ W;Iｴ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ 
campaign spending and the 2015 vote share, the main effect of spending is when the 2015 contest is 
at its most competitive, i.e. when the 2015 margin is zero). Figure 1 displays the interactions 
graphically with the estimated coefficient for each ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ spending along the 2015 Labour-
Conservative vote gap on the y-axis and the 2015 vote difference on the x-axis. This marginal effect 
is calculated H┞ ;SSｷﾐｪ デｴW IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデ aﾗヴ ; ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW ヮヴﾗS┌Iデ ﾗa デｴe marginality score 
;ﾐS デｴW IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデ aﾗヴ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴ;デ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞く  
 
In the model containing all Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐIｷWゲ デｴW ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉ WaaWIデ ﾗa L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ spending is uniformly 
positive (Figure 1a), changing very little between those seats where Labour was furthest behind the 
Conservatives in 2015 (to the left of the graph) and those where it was furthest ahead (to the right); 
the harder Labour campaigned in a constituency, the better its performance there relative to the 
Conservativesげ ヴWｪ;ヴSﾉWゲゲ ﾗa デｴW ゲW;デげゲ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲく For the Conservatives, the marginal effect of 
spending declines steeply (i.e. moving from left to right on the graph). Because the dependent 
variable is coded as (Labour vote share minus Conservative vote share), this negative marginal slope 
suggests that the Conservatives did better the harder they campaigned but, importantly, this effect 
varied according to the ゲW;デげゲ marginality, with the largest campaign dividends coming where the 
Conservatives were furthest behind Labour in 2015.  
 
This overall pattern changes somewhat in analyses of constituency sub-groups. Among seats won by 
either party in 2015 (Figure 1b), in the great majority of which they occupied the first two places, 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉ campaign effect declines as its competitive position relative to the Conservatives 
improves. For the Conservatives, the opposite pattern occurs, with the coefficient negative 
throughout.  In seats defended by either party, therefore, they enjoyed their largest campaign 
dividends in seats where the Conservatives did much better than Labour at the previous election. As 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ vis-à-vis the Conservatives improved, both parties experienced diminishing returns 
from their 2017 campaigns. 
 
Separate analyses of seats won by Labour in 2015 (Figure 1c) and the Conservatives (Figure 1d) 
confirm these conclusions. In the former (Figure 1c) both parties gained their largest campaign 
boosts in the most marginal seats but in their safest seats additional campaign efforts began to tell 
against them. OﾐIW L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ヲヰヱヵ ﾉW;S W┝IWWSWS ヴヵ ヮWヴIWﾐデ;ｪW ヮﾗｷﾐデゲが the marginal effect of 
increasing Conservative campaign effort in 2017 was to Hﾗﾗゲデ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ﾉW;Sが ┘ｴｷﾉW デｴW ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉ 
effect of increasing Labour campaign spending reduced it (in seats Labour was very unlikely to lose).   
 
Those nuances aside, these analyses clearly indicate that campaign effects are not uniform across 
constituencies; they are related not just to incumbent or challenger status but also to the sW;デげゲ 
marginality, where the returns from more spending are greatest, hence the following analyses of 
marginal seats only.  
 




This section focuses on the 123 English constituencies where Conservative and Labour occupied the 
first two places in 2015 ;ﾐS デｴW ┘ｷﾐﾐWヴげゲ ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴｷデ┞ ┘;ゲ under 15 percentage points.5 Labour won 57 
of those seats in 2015, losing six to the Conservatives in 2017; the Conservatives lost 21 of the 66 
seats they won in 2015. Figure 2 shows no uniform shift of support between the parties; the 2015 
margin of victory accounts for only 47 per cent of the variation in constituency margins in 2017. 
 
Figure 3 shows that Labour spent close to the maximum in most seats it was defending (i.e. to the 
right of the vertical line), but less in most of the six it lost in 2017 (Figure 3a). Its spending was more 
variable in Conservative-held marginals, averaging 64 per cent (compared to 90 per cent in Labour-
held seats) with a standard deviation of 23 points; it spent above that average in most of the seats 
gained in 2017. Conservative spending (Figure 3b) varied considerably in both the seats won in 2015 
(mean 77 per cent, standard deviation 15 per cent) and lost (mean 84 per cent, standard deviation 
12 per cent) with little evidence that campaigning intensity was linked to success; it spent close to 
the margin in several seats lost to Labour and no more than average in most of those gained. 
 
Figure 4a shows the percentage of respondents in each constituency contacted at home by Labour, 
averaging 32 per cent in constituencies it was defending and 21 per cent where it came second in 
2015; on average it contacted fewer voters in seats lost to the Conservatives in 2017 and more in 
those gained from its opponent. The Conservatives contacted many fewer respondents overall 
(averaging 11 per cent in seats they were defending and 13 per cent in those Labour was defending), 
with little evidence that winning or losing a seat in 2017 was linked to the intensity of that form of 
campaigning (Figure 4b). 
 
To test for campaigning efficacy we estimated regression models with the dependent variable as the 
2017 margin (Labour % of the votes cast minus Conservative %) and the independent variable the 
same measure for 2015. These models controlled for UKIP support in 2015 and whether UKIP fielded 
a candidate in 2017. In addition to spending by Labour and the Conservatives in the first set of 
models, Liberal Democratsげ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ was included because they were hoping for a revival from their 
poor performance in 2015. 
 
The results show three significant relationships (Table 2), including the expected strong link between 
the results in 2015 and 2017. Negative significant coefficients aﾗヴ UKIPげゲ ヲヰヱヵ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ show that the 
Conservatives benefited most from its collapse in 2017. Positive significant coefficients for Labour 
ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐSｷI;デW デｴ;デ デｴW ﾏﾗヴW ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷ┗W ｷデゲ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ デｴW HWデデWヴ ｷデゲ I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲげ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWs, 
especially in Labour-held seats (e.g. column 2); for each additional 10 per cent of the allowed 
spending (on average, about £1,400), L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ victory margin in Labour-held seats increased , 
compared to 2015, by 1.8 percentage points, whereas in Conservative-held seats an additional 10 
per cent spending by Labour decreased the Conservative 2015 victory margin by 0.7 percentage 
points (because the dependent variable is coded Labour minus Conservative vote share). 
Conservative spending had a very small, insignificant impact. 
 
The next set of models ヴWヮﾉ;IWS デｴW ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ H┞ デｴW ヮWヴIWﾐデ;ｪW ﾗa W;Iｴ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞げゲ 
residents contacted by each party by phone, at home, in the street, by social media and by email. 
Given small sample sizes, those ten variables were added using a stepwise procedure, after the first 
three predictors had been included. The results for all 123 constituencies (Table 3) show that Labour 
performed better the more voters it contacted at home and in the street, indicating that its 
campaigning strategy of relying strongly on inter-personal contacts clearly worked (on that strategy, 
developed in 2015 and maintained in 2017, see Watson, 2015); contacts at home were effective in 
Conservative-held seats and contacts in the street in those Labour was defending, The only 
                                                          
5 Fourteen Labour-Conservative marginals in Wales were not included because of the complexity introduced 
by the presence of Plaid Cymru candidates.  
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significant relationship with Conservative contact was a positive link between its telephone contacts 
in Conservative-held seats, but the more voters contacted by the Conservatives in that way the 
HWデデWヴ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWぁ 
 
A final set of models included both spending and contact variables, entered stepwise (Table 4). 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ┘;ゲ only effective in Conservative-held seats, where its contacts on the doorstep 
also significantly influenced the outcome に for each 10 per cent of allowed spending, the 
Conservative margin of victory in 2015 was reduced by 0.70 percentage points. Contacts on the 
street were most effective in Labour-held seats. Although the challenger party benefited from its 





The Scottish electoral scene and map has seen considerable recent volatility after a long period of 
Labour predominance (Johns 2018; Johnston et al. 2018). The SNP won 19.9% of the votes and six 
seats in 2010. Building on the momentum of the (ultimately unsuccessful) 2014 referendum 
campaign for Scottish independence and its eight years in power in the Scottish government, that 
share surged to 50% in 2015, delivering 56 of the 59 seats (Henderson and Mitchell 2018). The main 
loser was Labour; like the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, it retained only a single seat (losing 
40). 
 
The SNPげゲ vote share dropped substantially in 2017 to 36.9%, losing 21 seats. Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats gained 6 and 3 more seats respectively. Given the large Scottish majority against Brexit at 
the 2016 EU Referendum the SNPげs new leader tried デﾗ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲW ﾗﾐ デｴW UKげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ﾉW;┗W デｴW 
EU by proposing a further independence referendum. This proved unpopular with referendum-
weary Scottish voters in 2017, however, and helped the Conservatives, whose leader campaigned 
against a further referendum, win 28.6% of the votes and gain 12 seats.  
 
Virtually every seat was strongly contested in 2017 ┘ｴ;デW┗Wヴ デｴW “NPげゲ 2015 victory margin, 
although its main opposition varied across the constituencies: at least one of the three other parties 
spent at least 66 per cent of the maximum in 28 of the constituencies and at least 50 per cent in 34; 
the SNP spent over 50 per cent in 35.  Figure 5 shows W;Iｴ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ spending in 2017, according to its 
margin of victory/defeat in 2015. The SNP varied from spending close to the maximum in some seats 
to as little as 20-30 per cent in others that appeared reasonably safe (i.e. won by more than 20 
percentage points in 2015). Many where it spent close to the legal maximum were lost, however, all 
but one to the Conservatives. 
 
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats spent either close to the maximum (in a minority 
of seats) or to the minimum, ┘ｴWヴW;ゲ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ┘;ゲ ﾏﾗヴW ┘ｷSWﾉ┞ ゲヮヴW;S に its strength 
across most of the country until 2015 meant that it still had an organisation capable of raising funds 
in many constituencies. The Conservatives spent close to the maximum in all twelve seats gained 
from the SNP に although in five others similar high spending did not bring victory. They spent more 
than 50 per cent in few of the seats won by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, or in most of those 
retained by the SNP, suggesting a spatially very focused, largely successful, campaign. Labour also 
spent more on average in the seats it gained, but also more than half of the maximum in several 
others. The Liberal Democratsげ spending was concentrated in very few seats; it gained three but lost 
in four others. 
 
Figure 6 shows that all four parties contacted no voters at home in a substantial number of seats. 
The Conservatives were most active and were successful in most seats where they canvassed 
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extensively winning five from the SNP where they contacted more than 12 per cent of the 
electorate. The other parties contacted few voters in most seats, although both Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats saw some apparent returns where that limited activity was greatest. 
 
Four stepwise regression models were fitted, one per party, with the dependent variable its majority 
at the 2017 contest (a positive value if the party won there, negative if it lost). The first stage 
included the ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ 2015 majority; the second stage added ;ﾉﾉ aﾗ┌ヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヮWヴIWﾐデ;ｪWゲが ｷa 
statistically significantly related to the dependent variable; the final stage added the contact 
variables in a stepwise procedure.  
 
For all four parties, the 2017 outcome was positively related to its performance two years earlier 
(Table 5), accounting for around half of the variation. For three, but not the SNP, inclusion of the 
spending variables substantially increased the R2 values: the more the three opposition parties spent 
in a constituency the better their performance に for every additional 10 per cent of spending the 
Conservatives increased their 2017 vote share by 2.2 percentage points; for the same spending 
increase Labour increased its by 1.8 points, the Liberal Democrats by 3.3 points. Moreover, the more 
the Conservatives spent the weaker the SNP and Labour party performances; and デｴW CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗Wゲげ 
ﾗ┘ﾐ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ┘;ゲ ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮ;IデWS H┞ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪく If the SNP is 
IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デｴW けｷﾐI┌ﾏHWﾐデ ヮ;ヴデ┞げ in Scotland, these findings are consistent with other studies: 
intensive constituency campaigns are only effective for opposition parties. 
 
Finally, the ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iontact with voters had little overall impact. For Labour, as in England, the more 
voters contacted at home, the better its performance; both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 




These findings are largely consistent with, and substantially extend, other studies (e.g. Johnston and 
Pattie 2014; Fisher 2018a, 2018b). Campaigning by opposition parties is more generally more 
effective than that by the party in power immediately preceding the election に a conclusion 
considerably extended here which, unlike previous investigations, focuses on Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげゲ 2017 Labour-
Conservative marginals and on Scotland, where most seats were strongly contested. In the English 
marginal constituencies the governing Conservatives obtained no significant benefits from either 
their spending or their canvassing; that was also the case for the SNP, defending its incumbency in 
all but three Scottish constituencies. 
 
Indeed, the difference between the results for the Conservative party in the two countries is stark. In 
Scotland, where it was presented as the “NPげゲ most viable opposition overall, it targeted 
constituencies where victory appeared feasible, potentially benefiting from anti-SNP tactical voting 
by some who might otherwise have voted either Labour or Liberal Democrat に and the Conservatives 
won a majority of those constituencies (Curtice 2018b)く Iﾐ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐIｷWゲが ﾗﾐ デｴW 
other hand, the Conservativesげ spending and canvassing had little impact. As their lead in the polls 
dwindled through the six-week campaign, so too did the probability of wins there; a few seats were 
gained from Labour, but they were not those where the Conservatives campaigned hardest. Labour, 
however, placed great reliance on face-to-face campaigning by its activists and volunteer workers, 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ﾉ;ヴｪW ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴゲ ﾗa MﾗﾏWﾐデ┌ﾏ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲWS デﾗ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ aﾗヴ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ﾉW;SWヴ ;ﾐS 
his anti-austerity programme, with clear and substantial benefits. 
 
Much research has identified the substantial impacts local campaign spending and canvassing has on 
constituency results at British general elections, particularly for opposition parties. These analyses 
not only extend those findings to the 2017 general election but, by focusing on marginal 
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constituencies (which few other studies have done), have highlighted those impacts in the places 
where elections overall are won and lost. Across all constituencies the more that a party, especially a 
challenger party, spent in 2017 and the more contacts it made with voters, the better its 
performance. Returns on that campaigning were greater in the marginal seats: campaigning and 
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Table 1. Regression models of the impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election on vote 
share (Labour に Conservative) in Great Britain 
 
Model All GB Lab or Con Lab-Held    Con-Held 
 Seats Seats Seats Seats   
 
Constant 2.375 19.060 -21.254 5.396 
 (1.370) (1.327) (5.007) (3.625) 
Margin 2015 0.860 0.923 0.993 0.720 
 (0.034) (0.026) (0.111) (0.096) 
UKIP % 2015 -0.372 -0.919 -1.182 -0.590 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.072) (0.072) 
UKIP Candidate 2017 1.547 0.708 0.027 1.195 
 (0.677) (0.519) (0.849) (0.624) 
Labour Spend 0.161 0.053 0.088 0.044 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.056) (0.027) 
Conservative Spend -0.084 -0.059 -0.084 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.031) (0.046) 
LibDem Spend 0.054 0.008 0.062 0.078 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.042) (0.031) 
Lab spend * Margin 2015 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Con spend*Margin 2015 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
LD spend * Margin 2015 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
R2 0.940 0.969 0.913 0.879 
N 604 554 228 325 
Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients 






Table 2. Regression models of the impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election on vote 
share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England 
 
Model All Seats Lab-Held Con-Held 
Constant 17.51 7.64 8.01 
 (4.43) (9.33) (5.72) 
Margin 2015 1.04 1.65 0.79 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.19) 
UKIP % 2015 -1.26 -0.17 -0.84 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) 
UKIP Candidate 2017 -1.07 -1.78 -1.05 
 (1.16) (1.57) (1.55) 
Labour Spend 0.06 0.18 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) 
Conservative Spend 0.04 0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
LibDem Spend 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
R2 0.78 0.75 0.49 
N 123 57 66 
Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients 
statistically significant at p<.05 are in bold.  
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Table 3. Regression models of the impact of various canvassing modes at the 2017 general election 
on vote share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England 
 
Model All Seats Lab-Held Con-Held    
    
Constant 16.42 20.13 7.37 
 (2.23) (2.23) (3.99) 
Margin 2015 0.99 1.50 0.61 
 (0.07) (0.16) (0.20) 
UKIP % 2015 -1.11 -1.53 -0.72 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) 
UKIP Candidate 2017 -1.21 -1.65 -2.03 
 (1.04) (1.32) (1.45) 
Contact Labour Home 0.11 - 0.19 
 (0.04) - (0.07) 
Contact Labour Street 0.26 0.50 - 
 (0.09) (0.11) - 
Contact Cons Phone - - 0.36 
 - - (0.15) 
 
R2 0.81 0.81 0.56 
N 123 57 66 
Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients 




Table 4. Regression models of the impact of campaign spending and various canvassing modes at the 
2017 general election on vote share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England 
 
Model All Seats Lab-Held Con-Held    
    
Constant 16.42 20.11 2.43 
 (2.24) (2.06) (4.49) 
Margin 2015 0.99 1.51 0.51 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.20) 
UKIP % 2015 -1.11 -1.53 -0.71 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) 
UKIP candidate 2017 -1.21 -1.63 -1.95 
 (1.06) (1.34) (1.41) 
Labour Spend - - 0.07 
 - - (0.03) 
Labour Contact Home 0.11 - 0.15 
 (0.04) - (0.07)  
Labour Contact Street 0.26 0.50 -  
 (0.09) (0.11) - 
Cons Contact Phone - - 0.41 
 - - (0.14) 
 
R2 0.81 0.81 0.58 
N 123 57 66 
Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients 






Table 5. Stepwise regression models of the impact of campaign spending and various models of 
canvassing at the 2017 general election on vote share in Scotland 
 
Model SNP Con Labour LibDem 
Constant -10.31 -7.17 -2.13 -28.82 
 (2.54) (6.30) (4.61) (6.78) 
Majority 2015 0.65 0.29 0.47 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) 
SNP Spend - -  -0.15 
    (0.04) 
Conservative Spend -0.06 0.22 -0.17 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Labour Spend - -0.12 0.18 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
LibDem Spend - -0.12  0.33 
  (0.04)  (0.07) 
Party Contact  
 Phone 
  
 Home   0.44 
    (0.19) 
 Street 
 
 Social Media 
 
 Email  0.34  0.82 
   (0.14)  (0.26) 
 
R2   
 Stage 1 0.54 0.57 0.47 0.50 
 Stage 2 0.58 0.77 0.76 0.77 
 Stage 3 0.58 0.79 0.78 0.80 
N  59 59 59 59  
Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients 









Figure 1b. The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, all constituencies won in 






Figure 1c. The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, constituencies won by 
Labour in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 1d. The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, constituencies won by the 















Figure 3. Spending by Labour and the Conservatives in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginal 
constituencies in 2017. 
 












Figure 4. C;ﾐ┗;ゲゲｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐデ;Iデ ;デ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲげ ｴﾗﾏWゲ H┞ L;Hﾗ┌ヴ ;ﾐS デｴW Conservatives in the 123 
Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies in 2017. 
 









Figure 5. Spending by the four political parties at the 2017 general election in Scotland according to 



















Figure 6. Canvassing of voters at home by the four political parties at the 2017 general election in 
Scotland according to constituency marginality. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
